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IN THE SUPREME cciuwr OF THE STATE OF lJTMI 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
OREM CITY, a municipal cor-
poration of the State of 
Utah; PAYSON CITY, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah; and PLEASANT 
GROVE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 19,138 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal a decision granting respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth District Court granted respondent, Utah 
County's, Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of 
whether the appellant cities have a duty under Utah law 
to reimburse the respondent for the costs incurred in 
housing violators of municipal ordinances in the county 
jail. The Court ruled that the cities do have a duty to 
rcirr.u r c' the courrty on th< basis of Section 10-8-58, U.C.A. 
as amended), and the case of Grand Forks County v. 
City of !jr·and 123 ! .. 1 1.2d 42 (N.D. 1963). 
NATURE OF' RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the judg-
ment beloVI. 
STATEMErJT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts set 
forth in &ppcllants' Brief. 
ARGUMEUT 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH LAW, APPELLANTS ARE REQUIRED 
TO PAY THE COST OF' HOUSING THEIR RESPEC-
TIVE PRISONERS IN THE UTAH COUNTY JAIL. 
Section 10-8-58, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), relating to 
the duties of cities, provides as follows: 
Tliey may establish, erect and maintain city 
jails, houses of corrections and workhouses for the 
confinement of persons convicted of violating any city 
ordinances, make rules and regulations for the govern-
ment of the same, appoint necessary jailers and keepers, 
and use the county jail for the confinement or punishment 
of offenders, subject to such conditions as are imposed 
by law, and with the consent of the board of count 
commissioners. emphasis added 
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one at hand, the 31rrer:e of l!orth Dakota ruled that base_ 
on a statute similar to Sec:lon 10-d-58 U.C.A., a municipality 
was liable to the count/ for the cost of housinb municipal 
prisoners in tho county jail despite the fact that the municir 
tiaJ never· been billed. Gr:ir.j ForJ.:s Countv v. Ci tv of Grand 
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Al tl10clf'h i L i:; t:·Ll··· : L:it no state has a st2.tutory scheme 
identical to that or 'ltah, appellants have failed to cite any 
authority contrary to the general rule that cities are liable 
for the cost or housing city prisoners in the county jail. 
Sections 17-15-17(3) and 17-22-8, U.C.A., (1953, as amended) 
are relied upon by appellants to demonstrate Utah County's 
liability for providing free food and housing to any person 
by competent authority. Such an interpretation 
directly conflicts with other related statutes which without 
exception indicate a legislative intent to place ultimate 
liability on tho3P entities which impose a burden on the incar-
ceration system. With respect to towns, Section 10-13-23 U.C.A., 
as amended) provides as follows: 
10-13-23. Ordinances--Punishment for violation.--
To enforce obedience to the ordinances of the town the 
board of trustees may ordain and provide such fines, for-
feitures and penalties as it may deem proper; provided, 
that the fine or penalty for any offense shall be less 
than $100, and the imprisonment shall not exceed three 
months. All expenses incurred in prosecutions for the 
recovery of any fine, forfeiture or penalty shall be 
p:,id by the corporation. In case any person is committed 
to the county or municipal jail or other place of incar-
cer:ition as punishment or in default of the payment of a 
fine, or Cine and costs, he shall be required to work for 
the town at such labor as his strength will permit not 
eight hours in each working day. And a judgment 
that the defendant pay a fine, or a fine and costs, may 
also that he be imprisoned until the amount thereof 
i:; s.1.tlsfied, sp·2.:if:,·ing the extent of imprisonment, which 
exceed one da; for each $2 of such amount. The 
expense of boardine; p1·1snner:;_sl_i:t_J_l____t:'._e_['.51id by th0 
corporation. The board 01· may erect a jail 
for the town, and committed for· violation of' 
town ordinances may he imprisoned therein. (emphao;L; 
added) 
Section 77-18-1(4), U.C.A. (1953, as amended) requires 
reimbursement from the State of Utah for the costs of housinE 
a convicted felon sentenced to serve in the county jail as a 
condition of probation. Section 17-22-9, U.C.A. 0953, as 
amended) requires the Federal government to reimburse the count 
for the cost of housing Federal prisoners at the county jail. 
And, as heretofore stated, Section 10-8-58 requires that cities 
reimburse the county for the cost of housing municipal 
in the county jail. 
The rule is well settled that statutes which treat the 
subject matter should be interpreted as if they were intended: 
be consistent. 
Under this rule, each statute or section is 
construed in light of, with reference to, or in 
connection with, other statutes or sections. The 
object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into 
effect the intention of the legislature. It pro-
ceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes 
were governed by one spirit and policy, and were in-
tended to be consistent and harmonious in their 
several parts and provisions. Section 348, 50 Am. Jur. 
393-345. 
The proper interpretation of Sections 17-15-17(3) and 
17-22-8 is not that these statutes impose ultimate financial 
liability, but rather that they generally impose the duty of 
initial payment on the plaintiff, and are silent as to ultima'. 
liability which in accordance with Sections 10-8-58, 10-13-23, 
77-18-1 and 17-22-9 is placed upon the responsible political 
entity. Such an interpretation would be in accordance with 
:d•IJ\'1 r•:Jt reel f'Ul<' Cll;d \'iCJUlrJ Cr'CC!te a System by Which immediate 
1_·/.!'t:n "" ·2'.it1 L 1. r-.cL, U1·.1:· in::;uring 8 workable and efficient 
inc ar" •· 1':t t :l CJn sy ,; 1 crn and a method by v1hich those imposing the 
burden 011 the system n:ust bear the ultimate financial liability 
for tile related cost. An example of this would be Section 
17-15-17(11), U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which states that the 
county is liable for all expenses necessarily incurred by the 
county sheriff in his civil duties. Section 21-2-4, U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended), however, requires that many, if not most of 
these expenses, are to be collected as fees from those persons 
requesting the sheriff's services, thereby imposing ultimate 
liability on the responsible entity. 
Appellants also cite Section 32-1-24, U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended) recently enacted during the 1983 General Session of the 
Utah Legislature, as lending weight to its argument. The new 
enactment provides in part that a portion of revenue from a 
beer excise tax shall be allocated to the counties for confinement 
or rehabilitation or both, and construction and maintenance of 
facilities for confinement or rehabilitation or both of persons 
arrested for or convicted of alcohol related offenses. Guidelines 
for the use of such funds are set forth as follows: 
The appropriation provided for by this section is 
intended to supplement the budget of the law enforce-
ment agencies of each city, town, and county within 
the state and not to replace funds which would other-
wise be allocated for law enforcement or confinement 
or rehabilitation or both of persons arrested for or 
convicted of alcohol related offenses. [Section 
32-1-24, U.C.A. (1953, as amended)]. (emphasis added) 
The above guidelines evidence a legislative intent that 
SJ.id r.onies are not to be used to replace funds which have already 
of the Utah Legislature dl:l not I'L'! c•:tl Section:; 10-13-23, 
10-8-58, and 77-18-1(4), it follows that the 
ture did not intend these monies to replace the funds which ti 0· 
law towns, cities, and the State of Utah are required to provid• 
when housing their respective prisoners in the county jail. 
Section 32-1-24 is a legislative reponse to the increased 
costs associated with more stringent drunk-driving laws. It 
should not be interpreted as lending weight to an argument 
which would decrease funding for those entities such as Utah 
County which are legally required to shoulder the cost of both 
construction and maintenance of jails and rehabilitation centers 
as well as the confinement of both county and state alcohol 
offenders. 
POINT II 
CITY USE OF THE COUNTY JAIL IS STRICTLY 
CONTINGENT ON THE APPROVAL OF THE COUNTY 
COMMISSION. THE PERMISSIVE NATURE OF SUCH 
USE CREATES A MUliICIPAL POWER TO CONTRACT 
WITH THE COUNTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF JAIL USE 
AND THE CITIES ARE OBLIGATED ON IMPLIED 
CONTRACT TO PAY THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE 
BENEFITS THEY RECEIVE, ACCEPT, AND APPROPRIATE. 
As noted above, the legislature has devised a scheme of 
local criminal justice administration which allows each unit of 
local government to adopt and enforce ordinances applicable to 
local needs. With the exception of Circuit Court locations, 
it has also granted local governments the use of all fine and 
forfeiture money. Those cities with a Circuit Court are grante 
50% of all forfeitures, the remaining monies going to the 
7 
0:· 1;t;:1h tu the Cic,cuit Court's expenses. The legis-
l.ct u-.·. ha:o a.I';" ;·.r·;int c-J eovernments the power to levy and 
col Ln:cs t0 sufJport its municipal functions including 
crimin'll justice costs. In keeping with this principal, 
Sections 10-b-58 and 10-13-23 allow municipalities to establish, 
erect, and maintain city jails, houses of corrections, and 
working houses for the confinement of persons convicted of vio-
lating city ordinances. Such provisions indicate that the 
legislative intent was to create in cities, under local control and 
financing, the means for punishing violators of city ordinances. 
In addition, under Section 10-8-b5, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), the 
legislature granted cities the power to command the labor of 
individuals committed to the county jail on city projects. This 
grant confers a substantial benefit to cities in reduced labor 
costs. In discussing a statute, the Court in Grand Forks 
County v. City of Grand Forks stated that: 
Thus we see that the legislature provided that 
fines imposed for violation of a city ordinance, as 
well as work performed by a prisoner during his 
confinement, all inure to the benefit of the city. 
Surely, the legislature would not have intended that 
the expense of maintaining a city prisoner during his 
confinement in the county jail should be paid by the 
county, but that all of the benefits which might be 
derived from the imprisonment of offenders should inure 
to the benefit of the city. 
In granting the above powers and benefits to municipalities, 
the legislature also recognized that in some instances it may be 
uneconomical for all cities and towns to establish municipal 
jails. In response to this, the legislature allowed municipalities 
to make other arrangements for the incarceration of city prisoners. 
8 
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incarcerating municipal prisoners. 
The rule is well settled that a municipality or other 
political subdivision may become obligated on an implied contra 
to pay the reasonable value of benefits which it receives, acre> 
and appropriates, where the municipality has the power to contr2 
for such benefits. 38 Am. Jur., "Municipal Corporations", 
Sec. 515, p. 193; 84 ALR, p. 937. It was dee reed in Grand Forl:c 
County that: 
While there was no express agreement between the 
governing body of the city and the governing body of the 
county touching upon the care and maintenance of city 
prisoners in the county jail, the statute authorized 
such an agreement. Under such circumstances, an implied 
contract arose from the request of the city that its 
prisoners be confined in the county jail. 
Appellants do not dispute the validity of such a rule but 
argue that it does not apply in the instant case inasmuch as nc 
benefit is conferred upon the city when the county sheriff is 
legally required to accept all duly committed prisoners. Where 
a municipality is under a duty to eithec house its own prisoner: 
or pay to house them in the county jail, a benefit is received 
when the county provides food and lodging foe said prisoners, 
regardless of whether or not the county sheriff is required by 
law to accept the prisoner. This position was upheld by the 
9 
···f·l" r-. •. '" "1r·t ·. n ;;onrJt:,:t Co11nty where the Court stated: 
· r '" r . i t n:· n '· t, .. · U , , · j u d i r; i o l off i c er· o f th c 
city Jri :it le<Jst U1e force of' a request; 
etn·1 ttiv ('XI of its ordinances being 
ir:.r•c•scd upot1 .it:,; by la1v, a promise to pay 
tl1u·c·fur·c is imf•lied. 
Appellants also argue that they in fact do not use the Utah 
County Jail inasmuch as the commitment papers are signed by a 
Circuit Court Judge, rather than a City Judge. This argument 
would n•1t apply to appellants, t'leasant Grove City and Payson 
City, which are not Circuit Court locations. Appellant, Orem 
City, has been a Circuit Court location since the creation of a 
Circuit Court system in 1977. However, it is Orem City which 
en:1cts the or·dinances, arTc·sts tlic violator, requests that the 
alle 1;Pd violator be held in the Utah County Jail when bail is 
not posted, the violator, and requests that the Judge 
entt:r a ;r,uilty plea v;ith t!1e resulto.nt fine or jail time. Surely, 
it is in an Or·cm City prisoner, not a state prisoner who 
is thereafter confined in the Utah County Jail. 
'!'he ar;-;urnent ror esto.ulishlnt•; a basis for municipal liability 
under an implied contract ir1 the instant case is further strength-
ened by the f'act that until 1977, appellants' practice was to 
reimburse the respondent for the use of its jail to house municipal 
prisorn.:r·s, thecccby demonstrating an awareness by appellants of 
tht:ir· cuntractual oblit'.ati,.ns. 
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The Utah Supr«.·r11c: Cu111·t in ::tale v. 6t, P. 1061 
(1901), interpreted Article XJTI, as requiring that county 
taxation be limited to cuunty pur·poses. The Court also ruled 
that: 
Under the constitution the state has no 
power to make a disposition of county funds, and 
require that they be appropriated for other and 
different purposes than those for which by 
authority of the county they were collected. 
It has been appellants' position that the enforcement of 
city ordinances is a "state" purpose, for which the state can 
require the use of funds. Annellants rely on the case 
of Salt Lake County v. :::«lt L:1ke City, 134 !'. 560 (1913), as 
autlwrity for such a pc1siliurl. A care!'ul re'adi11c; of thl:;; case 
indicates that the Court actually supports plaintiff's positior 
that the enforcement of city ordinances is not a state-wide 
or even county-wide concern for which county funds may be exper. 
In Salt Lake County v. Scilt Lake City, the Cuurt upheld a 
statute which pr'ovided tl1at botll the city i.tnd the county share 
the cost of maintaining a juvenile center. The Court dee lareJ 
that to protect, care for, and ed11cate the indigent and delln·1· 
children who would someday assume the responsibilities of c11•· 
ship was a "public duty" and ". one in which every taxpayc· 
of the State of Utah was interested in". 
11 
r,,; :, ,., l, tfi,_. Lc,_:islature could require both county 
:111d c·ity '"" "c.l:tL• :q,<·nc:i·;cc" t.u fund tlic prot;rarn. The Court 
wa3 to point out, however, that the legislature could 
not. Lr1t•:rfcrc with activities which are a function of city 
government; am.l that the laH in question did not affect local 
self government. 
As was pointed out in !'espondcnt's initial memorandum, by 
no stretch of the imagination could the enforcement within a 
city of violations pertaining to Class "B" and "C" misdemeanors 
be considered a state-wide public purpose, or one in which every 
taxpayer in the State of Utah is interested. To the contrary, 
both the legislature and the Supreme Court have indicated that 
law enforcement within a political subdivision is not a county-
wide concern. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Salt 
Lake County, 550 P.2d 1291 (1976), upheld the language of 
Section 17-34-1-5 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which required that 
services provided by a county to its unincorporated area were to 
be paid from special service districts which collect taxes only 
from property in the unincorporated area of the county. The 
Court declared that: "To hold that the county may provide ser-
vices without attempting to collect money to defray the cost 
would serve as an unjust burden upon the city residents." 
It follows, therefore, that taxpayers in the unincorporated 
area of the county should not be required to help pay the cost of 
housing violators of city ordinances. 
12 
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Court in McCormick and c,;. v. n'";,;,·tt, lOIJ f'.:'rl o')2 (1917), 
interpreted Sections 2 and 3 uf Article XIII of the Utah Con-
stitution as follows: 
These provisions (Sections 2 and 3, Article 
XIII) of the constitution in plain and explicit 
terms provide that there shall be a uniform rate of 
taxation in this state so that every person, company, 
and corporation will be compelled to bear, as nearly as 
may be, his, her, or its pro-rata of the burdens of 
general taxation according to the value of the taxable 
property of such person or corporation. 
Section 17-29-3 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), requires that 
residents of the unincorporated area of Utah County pay a specia 
tax for law enforcement over and above the taxes collected for 
general county purposes. If county funds are used to pay for 
part of city law enforcement by housing city prisoners, then 
residents of the unincorporated area are being doubly taxed. 
Therefore, appellants' interpretation of Sections 17-15-17(3) 
and 17-22-8 would result in an unconstitutional application of 
the law. 
COHCLUSI01! 
Defendants' interpretation of the law would result in 
flicting laws and their unconstitutional application. Plaintir:· 
interpretation of the law would result in a fair and constitu-
tional process for meeting the expense of housing municipal 
violators in the county jail. The rule has always been to 
interpret a statute so as not to conflict with other statutes, 
and to maintain its constitutional validity. For al 1 the 
13 
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]·•·'I, "1' 1·1 I . .,U this day of July, 1983. 
tJU!\I. 1, T. vlOOTTOll 
Utah County f,ttorney 
STERLI t 
Deput 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
l hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to B1·yce McEuen, Orem City 
Attorney, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah 84057; Dave 
McMullin, Payson City Attorney, P.O. Box 176, Payson, Utah 
b4G51; and John C. Backlund, Pleasant Grove City Attorney, 
1021 tlorth University, h200, Provo, Utah $46011, 
day of July, 1983. 
S-ecretary 
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